# What courts have held · Every case, done/total

> Forty-five Supreme Court cases, every one opened: the Court has never ruled on the loop as a whole.

Gavin Robert McGowen · interstellarblends.com. A study of the texts, not legal advice.

Canonical: https://clause5loop.com/courts/

## The scalpel

- Forty-five Supreme Court cases. Every one opened and quoted.
- On the currency: “Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of the Congress.”
- On revenue bills: “revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word”.
- On gain: taxed “upon the difference between the purchase and selling price”.
- The whole, never decided. Every part, decided.

## In plain words

We read 45 Supreme Court cases. None rules on the whole loop. Every piece of it has been decided.

## The question

**What has the Supreme Court decided about money, taxes and gains?**

That Congress may make paper money a legal tender, that contracts cannot fetter its power over the currency, that revenue bills levy taxes in the strict sense, and that a gain is taxed on the dollar difference.

## The study, as written

Gavin's question in text 03 is whether the Supreme Court has ruled on this: "it's never been tried before the Supreme Court where they ruled that it's OK for the executive branch to dilute the dollar by increasing the money supply" (20:36). The study answers by listing every case on its list and opening each one: 45 Supreme Court cases, 45 opened and quoted, and six cases from other courts and one opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel, each opened and quoted. Each entry gives up to three of the passages read, at their pinpoints, and the premises they bear on. Quotation marks inside a passage are set as single marks.

### The Supreme Court, 1796–1897

- **Hylton v. United States (1796).** "I never entertained a doubt, that the principal, I will not say, the only, objects, that the framers of the constitution contemplated, as falling within the rule of apportionment, were a capitation tax and a tax on land." (Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 177 (1796) (Paterson, J.))
- **Marbury v. Madison (1803).** "It cannot be presumed, that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it." (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803)) *Bears on:* N4c.
- **McCulloch v. Maryland (1819).** "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are Constitutional." (McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (as Justia prints it; OpenJurist differs in capitals))
- **Craig v. Missouri (1830).** "To ‘emit bills of credit,’ conveys to the mind the idea of issuing paper, intended to circulate through the community for its ordinary purposes, as money, which paper is redeemable at a future day" (Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. 410, 432) *Bears on:* AS3.
- **United States v. Marigold (1850).** "We trace both the offense and the authority to punish it to the power given by the Constitution to coin money, and to the correspondent and necessary power and obligation to protect and to preserve in its purity this constitutional currency for the benefit of the nation." (United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. 560, 568 (1850)) "1st. That Congress had power and authority, under the Constitution, to enact so much of the twentieth section of the Act of March 3, 1825, entitled ‘An act more effectually to provide for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States, and for other purposes,’ as relates to bringing into the United States counterfeit coins." (United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. 560, 570)
- **Veazie Bank v. Fenno (1869).** "It cannot be doubted that under the Constitution the power to provide a circulation of coin is given to Congress. And it is settled by the uniform practice of the government and by repeated decisions, that Congress may constitutionally authorize the emission of bills of credit." (Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533, 548-549)
- **Bronson v. Rodes (1869).** "A contract to pay a certain number of dollars in gold or silver coins is, therefore, in legal import, nothing else than an agreement to deliver a certain weight of standard gold, to be ascertained by a count of coins, each of which is certified to contain a definite proportion of that weight." (Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U.S. 229, 250) "It follows that there were two descriptions of money in use at the time the tender under consideration was made, both authorized by law, and both made legal tender in payments." (Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U.S. 229, 251) "It seems to us clear beyond controversy that the act must receive the reasonable construction, not only warranted but required by the comparison of its provisions with the provisions of other acts, and with each other; and that upon such reasonable construction it must be held to sustain the proposition that express contracts to pay coined dollars can only be satisfied by the payment of coined dollars. They are not ‘debts’ which may be satisfied by the tender of United States notes." (Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U.S. 229, 254)
- **Hepburn v. Griswold (1870).** "We are obliged to conclude that an act making mere promises to pay dollars a legal tender in payment of debts previously contracted, is not a means appropriate, plainly adapted, really calculated to carry into effect any express power vested in Congress; that such an act is inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution; and that it is prohibited by the Constitution." (Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603, 625) "We are obliged, therefore, to hold that the defendant in error was not bound to receive from the plaintiffs the currency tendered to him in payment of their note, made before the passage of the act of February 25th, 1862." (Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603, 626)
- **Legal Tender Cases (1871).** "But the obligation of a contract to pay money is to pay that which the law shall recognize as money when the payment is to be made." (Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 548) "That provision has always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power." (Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 551) "and that the words, ‘and emit bills,’ were, after some debate, struck out." (Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 559 (Bradley, J., concurring)) *Bears on:* AS3, AU12, B10, BU6, BU8, K-B3.
- **Springer v. United States (Oct. Term 1880).** "Our conclusions are, that direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate; and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error complains is within the category of an excise or duty." (Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602) "October Term, 1880" (Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (LII), term line)
- **Juilliard v. Greenman (1884).** "The adoption of the motion to strike out the words ‘and emit bills’ from the clause ‘to borrow money and emit bills on the credit of the United States’ is quite inconclusive." (Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 443) "Such being our conclusion in matter of law, the question whether at any particular time, in war or in peace, the exigency is such, by reason of unusual and pressing demands on the resources of the government, or of the inadequacy of the supply of gold and silver coin to furnish the currency needed for the uses of the government and of the people, that it is, as matter of fact, wise and expedient to resort to this means, is a political question, to be determined by Congress when the question of exigency arises, and not a judicial question, to be afterwards passed upon by the courts." (Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 450) *Bears on:* AS3, AU12, B10, BU2, BU8, K-B4.
- **Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1895).** "First. We adhere to the opinion already announced, that, taxes on real estate being indisputably direct taxes, taxes on the rents or income of real estate are equally direct taxes. Second. We are of opinion that taxes on personal property, or on the income of personal property, are likewise direct taxes. Third. The tax imposed by sections twenty-seven to thirty-seven, inclusive, of the act of 1894, so far as it falls on the income of real estate and of personal property, being a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution, and, therefore, unconstitutional and void because not apportioned according to representation, all those sections, constituting one entire scheme of taxation, are necessarily invalid." (Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895)) *Bears on:* AU7.
- **Twin City Bank v. Nebeker (1897).** "Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question proves that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." (Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202) "There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government." (Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 203) *Bears on:* A7, AU8, B3, BU1, BU6, BX6, K-B2.

### The Supreme Court, 1906–1935

- **Millard v. Roberts (1906).** "This language is applicable to the acts of Congress in the case at bar. Whatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." (Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 437) *Bears on:* A7, AU8, BU1.
- **Ling Su Fan v. United States (1910).** "The power to ‘coin money and regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin,’ is a prerogative of sovereignty and a power exclusively vested in the Congress of the United States." (Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U.S. 302, 310) "Conceding the title of the owner of such coins, yet there is attached to such ownership those limitations which public policy may require by reason of their quality as a legal tender and as a medium of exchange." (Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U.S. 302, 310) "These limitations are due to the fact that public law gives to such coinage a value which does not attach as a mere consequence of intrinsic value." (Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U.S. 302, 310-311) (and 3 more passages) *Bears on:* A1, AS7.
- **Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (1911).** "In the Senate, the proposed tax was removed from the bill, and the corporation tax, in a measure, substituted therefor. The bill having properly originated in the House, we perceive no reason in the constitutional provision relied upon why it may not be amended in the Senate in the manner which it was in this case. The amendment was germane to the subject-matter of the bill and not beyond the power of the Senate to propose." (Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 143) "The tax under consideration, as we have construed the statute, may be described as an excise upon the particular privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity, i.e., with the advantages which arise from corporate or quasi corporate organization; or, when applied to insurance companies, for doing the business of such companies." (Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 151) *Bears on:* A7, AU7, K-A4.
- **Stratton's Independence v. Howbert (1913).** "And, however the operation shall be described, the transaction is indubitably ‘business’ within the fair meaning of the act of 1909; and the gains derived from it are properly and strictly the income from that business; for ‘income’ may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, and here we have combined operations of capital and labor." (Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415) "We have no difficulty, therefore, in concluding that the proceeds of ores mined by a corporation from its own premises are to be taken as a part of the gross income of such corporation." (Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 417) *Bears on:* A4.
- **Rainey v. United States (1914).** "Without intimating that there is judicial power after an act of Congress has been duly promulgated to inquire in which House it originated for the purpose of determining its validity, and upon the assumption for the sake of the argument that such power may be invoked, again we think the court below disposed of the contention upon a ground entirely satisfactory which we adopt and approve, the court saying:" (Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 317) "Having become an enrolled and duly authenticated Act of Congress, it is not for this Court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill." (Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 317 (the court below, quoted and adopted by the Court)) *Bears on:* A7.
- **Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co. (1916).** "the confusion is not inherent, but rather arises from the conclusion that the Sixteenth Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of taxation -- that is, a power to levy an income tax which, although direct, should not be subject to the regulation of apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes." (Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 11) "It is clear on the face of this text that it does not purport to confer power to levy income taxes in a generic sense -- an authority already possessed and never questioned --" (Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 17) "the whole purpose of the Amendment was to relieve all income taxes when imposed from apportionment from a consideration of the source whence the income was derived." (Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 18) *Bears on:* AU7, K-A4.
- **Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co. (1916).** "it was settled that the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new power of taxation, but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged, and being placed in the category of direct taxation subject to apportionment by a consideration of the sources from which the income was derived -- that is, by testing the tax not by what it was, a tax on income, but by a mistaken theory deduced from the origin or source of the income taxed." (Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112-113 (part of a sentence)) *Bears on:* AU7, K-A4.
- **Lynch v. Hornby (1918), quoting the Act of 1913.** "That there shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid annually upon the entire net income arising or accruing from all sources in the preceding calendar year to every citizen of the United States, . . . and to every person residing in the United States, ... a tax of 1 per centum per annum upon such income" (Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II A, subdivision 1, as quoted in Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 342 (1918) (omissions the Court's)) "That, subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are hereinafter allowed, the net income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service . . . , also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any lawful business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever" (Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II B, as quoted in Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 342 (1918) (omission the Court's))
- **Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co. (1918).** "Whatever difficulty there may be about a precise and scientific definition of ‘income,’ it imports, as used here, something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax; conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities." (Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185) "Understanding the term in this natural and obvious sense, it cannot be said that a conversion of capital assets invariably produces income. If sold at less than cost, it produces rather loss or outgo." (Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185) "There having been no change in market values during these years, the deduction did but restore to the capital in money that which had been withdrawn in stumpage cut, leaving the aggregate of capital neither increased nor decreased, and leaving the residue of the gross receipts to represent the gain realized by the conversion, so far as that gain arose while the act was in effect." (Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 188) *Bears on:* A4, AS8.
- **Eisner v. Macomber (1920).** "Here, we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital; not a growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value, proceeding from the property, severed from the capital, however invested or employed, and coming in, being ‘derived’ -- that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal -- that is income derived from property." (Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207) "The Sixteenth Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing clauses of the original Constitution and the effect attributed to them before the Amendment was adopted." (Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 205) "‘Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,’ provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets" (Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207) (and 1 more passage) *Bears on:* A4, AS8.
- **Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka (1921).** "There can be no doubt that the word must be given the same meaning and content in the Income Tax Acts of 1916 and 1917 that it had in the Act of 1913." (Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519) "gains, profits, and income derived from . . . sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in real or personal property . . . or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever." (Act of Sept. 8, 1916, § 2(a), as quoted in Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 516 (omissions the Court's)) "it is palpable that it was a ‘gain or profit’ ‘produced by’ or ‘derived from’ that investment, and that it ‘proceeded’ and was ‘severed’ or rendered severable from it by the sale for cash, and thereby became that ‘realized gain’ which has been repeatedly declared to be taxable income within the meaning of the constitutional amendment and the acts of Congress." (Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 520) (and 2 more passages) *Bears on:* A4, AX4.
- **Goodrich v. Edwards (1921).** "It is plain that this assessment was on the profit accruing after March 1, 1913, the effective date of the act, realized to the owner by the sale after deducting his capital investment." (Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U.S. 527, 534 (1921)) "taxable person shall include gains, profits, and income derived from . . . sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, . . . or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever." (Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U.S. 527, 535 (1921) (quoting the income tax act of 1916 as amended)) "we therefore agree with the Solicitor General that since no gain was realized on this investment by the plaintiff in error no tax should have been assessed against him." (Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U.S. 527, 535 (1921))
- **Walsh v. Brewster (1921).** "The District Court, however, held that any gain realized by the sale was a mere conversion of capital assets and was not income which could lawfully be taxed. In this respect the court fell into error. The tax was properly assessed, but only upon the difference between the purchase and selling price of the bonds as stated." (Walsh v. Brewster, 255 U.S. 536, 538 (1921)) *Bears on:* AX4.
- **Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co. (1926).** "The loss was less than it would have been if marks had not declined in value; but the mere diminution of loss is not gain, profit or income." (Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 175) "The result of the whole transaction was a loss." (Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 175) *Bears on:* AS5, AU4.
- **J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States (1928).** "If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power." (J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409) "So long as the motive of Congress and the effect of its legislative action are to secure revenue for the benefit of the general government, the existence of other motives in the selection of the subjects of taxes can not invalidate Congressional action." (J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412) "Section 315 and its provisions are within the power of Congress." (J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 413) (and 3 more passages) *Bears on:* A7, A8, AU11, AU9.
- **Taft v. Bowers (1929).** "There is nothing in the Constitution which lends support to the theory that gain actually resulting from the increased value of capital can be treated as taxable income in the hands of the recipient only so far as the increase occurred while he owned the property." (Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 484) "Income is the thing which may be taxed -- income from any source." (Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 481) "B maintains that only $3,000 -- the appreciation during her ownership -- can be regarded as income; that the increase during the donor's ownership is not income assessable against her within intendment of the Sixteenth Amendment." (Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 479) (and 1 more passage)
- **Weiss v. Wiener (1929).** "The income tax laws do not profess to embody perfect economic theory." (Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333, 335 (1929)) "They ignore some things that either a theorist or a business man would take into account in determining the pecuniary condition of the taxpayer. They do not charge for appreciation of property or allow a loss from a fall in market value unless realized in money by a sale. A stockholder does not pay for accumulated profits of his corporation unless he receives a dividend. That is the general principle upon which these laws go." (Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333, 335 (1929)) *Bears on:* AU4, K-A7.
- **Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co. (1931).** "there would still be the practical necessity of computing the tax on the basis of annual or other fixed taxable periods, which might result in the taxpayer's being required to pay a tax on income in one period exceeded by net losses in another." (Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 366 (part of a sentence)) "The assessment was properly made under the statutes." (Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 367)
- **United States v. Kirby Lumber Co. (1931).** "The defendant in error has realized within the year an accession to income, if we take words in their plain popular meaning, as they should be taken here." (United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3) "As a result of its dealings it made available $137,521.30 assets previously offset by the obligation of bonds now extinct." (United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3) "We see nothing to be gained by the discussion of judicial definitions." (United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3) (and 1 more passage) *Bears on:* A4.
- **Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. (1935).** "The broad and comprehensive national authority over the subjects of revenue, finance, and currency is derived from the aggregate of the powers granted to the Congress, embracing the powers to lay and collect taxes, to borrow money, to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standards of weights and measures, and the added express power ‘to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution’ the other enumerated powers." (Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 303 (1935)) "Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of the Congress." (Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 307) "The same reasoning applies to the constitutional authority of the Congress to regulate the currency and to establish the monetary system of the country." (Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 311) (and 1 more passage) *Bears on:* A1, AU1, B10, BU2, BU8.
- **Nortz v. United States (1935).** "The currency paid to the plaintiff for his gold certificates was then on a parity with that standard of value. It cannot be said that, in receiving the currency on that basis, he sustained any actual loss." (Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 329) "Plaintiff explicitly states his concurrence in the Government's contention that the Congress has complete authority to regulate the currency system of the country." (Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 328) "The facts certified by the Court of Claims may be thus summarized: Plaintiff brought suit as owner of gold certificates of the Treasury of the United States of the nominal amount of $106,300." (Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 323) (and 1 more passage) *Bears on:* A1.
- **Perry v. United States (1935).** "Plaintiff has not shown, or attempted to show, that in relation to buying power he has sustained any loss whatever." (Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 357) "On the contrary, in view of the adjustment of the internal economy to the single measure of value as established by the legislation of the Congress, and the universal availability and use throughout the country of the legal tender currency in meeting all engagements, the payment to the plaintiff of the amount which he demands would appear to constitute not a recoupment of loss in any proper sense but an unjustified enrichment." (Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 357-358) "But Congress was without power to reduce expenditures by abrogating contractual obligations of the United States." (Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 352) (and 2 more passages) *Bears on:* AS5, AU4, AX4.
- **Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935).** "The commission is to be non-partisan; and it must, from the very nature of its duties, act with entire impartiality." (Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624) "We think it plain under the Constitution that illimitable power of removal is not possessed by the President in respect of officers of the character of those just named." (Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629) "we hold that no removal can be made during the prescribed term for which the officer is appointed, except for one or more of the causes named in the applicable statute." (Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632) *Bears on:* AU2.

### The Supreme Court, 1955–2026

- **Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. (1955).** "This Court has frequently stated that this language was used by Congress to exert in this field ‘the full measure of its taxing power.’" (Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429) "Here we have instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion." (Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431) "But it was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions." (Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431) *Bears on:* A4.
- **United States v. Munoz-Flores (1990).** "At base, though, the Framers' purpose was to protect individual rights." (United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 395) "In short, this case has none of the characteristics that Baker v. Carr identified as essential to a finding that a case raises a political question. It is therefore justiciable." (United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 396) "general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a ‘Bil\[l\] for raising Revenue’ within the meaning of the Origination Clause." (United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 397-398) *Bears on:* A7, AU8, B3, BS5, BU1, BX6.
- **NFIB v. Sebelius (2012).** "We thus ask whether the shared responsibility payment falls within Congress's taxing power, ‘\[d\]isregarding the designation of the exaction, and viewing its substance and application.’" (NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (opinion of the Court, Part III-C)) "This process yields the essential feature of any tax: it produces at least some revenue for the Government." (NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (opinion of the Court, Part III-C)) *Bears on:* BS6, BU6.
- **Seila Law LLC v. CFPB (2020).** "We hold that the CFPB’s leadership by a single individual removable only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violates the separation of powers." (Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, opinion of the Court, Part III) "These two exceptions—one for multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive power, and one for inferior officers with limited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority—“represent what up to now have been the outermost constitutional limits of permissible congressional restrictions on the President’s removal power.”" (Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, opinion of the Court, Part III-A) "In 2010, Congress acted on these proposals and created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as an independent financial regulator within the Federal Reserve System." (Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, opinion of the Court, Part I-A) (and 3 more passages) *Bears on:* AU2.
- **Moore v. United States (2024).** "The MRT therefore falls squarely within Congress's constitutional authority to tax." (Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. \_\_\_ (2024) (opinion of the Court)) "We do not decide that question today." (Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. \_\_\_ (2024) (opinion of the Court)) "To decide this case, we need not resolve that disagreement over realization." (Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. \_\_\_ (2024) (opinion of the Court)) (and 2 more passages) *Bears on:* A4.
- **Trump v. Wilcox (2025).** "We disagree. The Federal Reserve is a uniquely structured, quasi-private entity that follows in the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States" (Trump v. Wilcox, 605 U.S. \_\_\_ (2025) (order of May 22, 2025)) *Bears on:* A8, AU2.
- **FCC v. Consumers' Research (2025).** "We hold that no impermissible transfer of authority has occurred." (FCC v. Consumers' Research, 606 U.S. \_\_\_ (2025) (opinion of the Court)) "we have long asked whether Congress has set out an ‘intelligible principle’ to guide what it has given the agency to do." (FCC v. Consumers' Research, 606 U.S. \_\_\_ (2025) (opinion of the Court)) "Twice before, we have rejected a party's request to create a special nondelegation rule for revenue-raising legislation." (FCC v. Consumers' Research, 606 U.S. \_\_\_ (2025) (opinion of the Court)) (and 1 more passage) *Bears on:* A8, AU11.
- **Trump v. Slaughter (2026).** "The FTC's for-cause removal provision violates the separation of powers." (Trump v. Slaughter, 609 U.S. \_\_\_ (2026) (opinion of the Court)) "If anything more is left of Humphrey's, we overrule it." (Trump v. Slaughter, 609 U.S. \_\_\_ (2026) (opinion of the Court)) "The FTC unquestionably exercises executive power, and must therefore be controlled by the Chief Executive, in whom such power is vested." (Trump v. Slaughter, 609 U.S. \_\_\_ (2026) (opinion of the Court)) (and 3 more passages) *Bears on:* A8, AU2.
- **Trump v. Cook (2026).** "To accept any one of those arguments would in effect transform the Federal Reserve’s for-cause protection into at-will employment—an interpretive leap out of step with the statute Congress enacted and our Nation’s tradition of central banking protected from political interference. We therefore deny the Government’s application." (Trump v. Cook, 609 U.S. \_\_\_ (2026) (opinion of the Court)) "Like its predecessors, the Federal Reserve operates at a deliberate remove from the ordinary political process. It sets its own budget, free of congressional control." (Trump v. Cook, 609 U.S. \_\_\_ (2026) (opinion of the Court)) *Bears on:* A8, AU2.

### Other courts, and the Office of Legal Counsel

- **Gajewski v. Commissioner (T.C. 1976).** "In essence, petitioners argue that a dollar is not a dollar because its purchasing power has allegedly declined and because paper currency cannot be converted to gold." (Gajewski v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 181 (1976) (OpenJurist ¶ 50)) "We read Bates as holding that for purposes of the tax law, a dollar is what Congress says it is, without regard to intrinsic value or lack thereof." (Gajewski v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 181 (1976) (OpenJurist ¶ 52)) "In so doing, we hold that the statutory gold content of the dollar is irrelevant for purposes of computing petitioner’s taxable income" (Gajewski v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 181 (1976) (OpenJurist ¶ 53; part of a sentence)) *Bears on:* A6, AU4.
- **Sibla v. Commissioner (T.C. 1977).** "We have in numerous cases held that a taxpayer is not entitled to a deduction nor any other adjustment to his gross income because of the fact that the value of a dollar may have declined in relationship to silver or gold." (Sibla v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 422 (1977) (OpenJurist ¶ 50)) "We, therefore, hold that petitioner is not entitled to any adjustment in the gross income he received because of any decline in value of the dollar with respect to gold or silver." (Sibla v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 422 (1977) (OpenJurist ¶ 50)) *Bears on:* AU4.
- **Birkenstock v. Commissioner (7th Cir. 1981).** "The measure of the taxpayers' taxable income is in dollars, and the par value of the dollar in gold for the issuance of gold certificates is not a factor in the determination of their income." (Birkenstock v. Commissioner, 646 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)) *Bears on:* A6, AU4.
- **Hellermann v. Commissioner (T.C. 1981).** "The sole issue for our decision is whether that portion of gain from the sale of property, which is attributable solely to inflation, is income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment." (Hellermann v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1361 (1981) (the statement of the issue)) *Bears on:* AS10, AU4, AX4.
- **Stelly v. Commissioner (5th Cir. 1986).** "The Stellys' contention that they are entitled to an inflation adjustment to their interest income is plainly incorrect." (Stelly v. Commissioner, 804 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)) "Section 61 of the Code defines gross income broadly as ‘all income from whatever source derived,’ with interest specifically included. \[26 U.S.C. Sec. 61(a)(4)\]." (Stelly v. Commissioner, 804 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1986)) "In order for any part of the Stellys' interest income to escape taxation, there must be a specific statutory provision setting forth the deduction. The Stellys cite no statutory or judicial authority for such an adjustment and there is none." (Stelly v. Commissioner, 804 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1986)) (and 1 more passage) *Bears on:* A3.
- **Nordtvedt v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 165 (2001).** "In Hellermann v. Commissioner, supra, the taxpayers argued that gain that was realized from the sale of property should be adjusted to take into account the inflation that occurred during the ownership of the property. We disagreed. First, we relied upon ‘the well-established doctrine that Congress has the power and authority to establish the dollar as a unit of legal value with respect to the determination of taxable income, independent of any value the dollar might also have as a commodity.’ Id. at 1364." (Nordtvedt (Tax Court, 2001), quoting Hellermann, 77 T.C. at 1364) "Under this doctrine, the taxpayers’ gain must be measured on the basis of the nominal gain on the sale of property, not on the basis of a gain reduced by an inflation factor, or the real gain in an economic sense." (Nordtvedt (Tax Court, 2001), page 10) "However, as previously stated, the applicable statutes and regulations do not provide that petitioner may take inflation into account." (Nordtvedt (Tax Court, 2001), page 10) (and 3 more passages) *Bears on:* AX4.
- **Office of Legal Counsel, indexing of basis (1992).** "The Department of the Treasury does not have legal authority to index capital gains for inflation by means of regulation." (OLC, Legal Authority of the Department of the Treasury to Issue Regulations Indexing Capital Gains for Inflation (Sept. 1, 1992)) "For these reasons, we concur in your conclusion that the legislative record evidences a clear congressional intent that ‘cost’ be given its common and ordinary meaning, that is, price paid in nominal dollars not adjusted for inflation." (OLC (Sept. 1, 1992)) *Bears on:* A3, AS6.

### What the cases decide

None of the 45 Supreme Court cases holds that the Executive may dilute the dollar by increasing the money supply, and none passes on the loop as text 01 puts it. The Court has decided its parts: that Congress may make paper money a legal tender and that the exigency is "a political question, to be determined by Congress"; that "Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of the Congress" over the currency; that revenue bills "are those that levy taxes in the strict sense"; and that a gain is taxed on "the difference between the purchase and selling price". The Tax Court decided the inflation part of a gain in 1981 (Hellermann), and held again in 2001 that the statutes do not let a taxpayer "take inflation into account" (Nordtvedt). Gavin is right that the question as he puts it has never been decided as a whole. Each part of it has been.